THE ROLE OF LIGHT MINE PROTECTED VEHICLES (MPV) IN HOME LAND SECURITY OPERATIONS

One of the many equations used in warfare is “Mobility + Protection + Fire Power = Combat Survivability”. The success of combat survivability lies however in the correct application and combination of these basic elements for a given scenario. On the one side is the infantry fighter who has the best chance of success and survivability in certain conditions like jungle and urban warfare due to his inherent extreme mobility and high applicable fire power. On the other hand is the main battle tank (MBT) which has the ideal combination of mobility, protection and fire power for almost all scenarios of symmetric warfare except mountains, jungles and urban areas. Although these excellent combat machines can be deployed successfully in most situations, the costs of deployment in terms of material losses and casualties in closed or restricted terrain like the before mentioned will be intolerable. This led to the decline, not exclusion, in the use of MBT’s and other sophisticated war machines in asymmetric warfare in favour of mine protected vehicles (MPV’s). The development, growth and deployment of MPV’s can to a large extent be attributed to the South African operations in northern Namibia and southern Angola where PLAN, the army of SWAPO, used tank mines and improvised explosives ingenuously and successfully to impair the mobility of and inflict casualties on the superior South African forces. The South African solution consisted inter alia of hard surfaced roads for their logistic convoys and the use of MPV’s for their tactical movement. The MPV’s enabled them to move cross country thus avoiding opportunistic or harass mines and to minimize casualties in case of a mine detonation when they were forced to move on roads and tracks that were not “sweeped” or “sanitized”. The success of the use of MPV’s for the South African combat troops was that it restored mobility with the added advantage of protection and fire power. As the mine and IED (improvised explosive devices) in Iraq and  Afghanistan escalated the requirement for mine and IED protection also escalated and MPV’s became heavier, to such an extent that in many cases their movement was restricted to roads, exactly what any insurgent, militant or guerilla force would pray for. What has this to do with the use of light MPV’s in Homeland Security Operations? Homeland Security Operations are mostly caused by a group of citizens, revolutionaries or insurgents often referred to as militants who want to change the existing political order or “regime” by any means to one that suits their purposes. Whether their grievances are legitimate or not and their actions justified or not, is not relevant for the purpose of this paper. The fact that they want to replace the existing authorities by any means is relevant. Their main weapons are time, patience, propaganda and popular support. The longer they drag out the “struggle” the costlier the counter operations become and the more unpopular the authorities become especially when harsh laws are implemented and civilians die in the cross fire. Their methods include intimidation, vandalism, hooliganism as well as hit and run tactics against the security forces. They use the population as a shield and operate from safe bases in remote areas or from safe shelters amongst the population, especially densely populated areas like slums. Their tactics consist of luring the security forces into areas where they can be massacred before disappearing again amongst the population or to their bases. In many cases the security forces react by sending in bigger forces and out of sheer desperation act with overwhelming force in densely populated areas causing high collateral damage and casualties – a propaganda gift from heaven for the militants. Regarding equipment, the security forces tend to react by using heavier and better protected equipment, in most cases with reduced mobility thus forcing them into a reactive state – the use of heavy MRAP vehicles in Afghanistan is a typical example. The solution is not reaction, but proactive operations – TAKE THE FIGHT TO THE THREAT. A fundamental requirement for success to “Take the fight to the threat” is intelligence which is in any case fundamental for the success of any operation. Notwithstanding the successful use of high technology methods of information gathering, the time honored methods of surveillance, patrolling and informers remain valid either as the main means or complementary to high technology surveillance. To ensure success the security forces must have a visible and credible presence all over the affected area to cover terrain, instill confidence and act decisively, they must create the impression to be everywhere all the time and be invincible. They must have the mobility to reach far and wide over all types of terrain, the protection to act with confidence and the fire power to destroy threats with the minimum collateral damage and casualties. Heavy cumbersome MPV’s like MARAP’s  alone do not guarantee this, but a high mobility force using light MPV’s supported by medium or heavy MPV’s will ensure success. A force equipped with light MPV’s will be able to move quickly by road from one village to the next, move safely and effectively in densely populated areas, use various jungle or cross-country tracks and finally move into near inaccessible areas for surveillance and direct attacks on militant bases. With a gross vehicle mass of less than 10 tons these vehicles can use makeshift bridges, cause minimum damage to the environment and can also be airlifted from one region to another. They give protection against opportunistic IED’s, hand grenades and small arms fire and due to their mobility allow the security forces freedom to use various and unexpected routes, adding to the confusion of the militants. The APC will typically carry a maximum crew of ten including a driver and be armed with one or two light machine guns while the Patrol vehicle will carry a total crew of six or less and be armed with a heavy machine gun and a light machine gun. These MPV’s will typically be used in pairs consisting of one APC and one Patrol when operating on their own thus providing mutual support in case of an ambush. The heavy IED’s that destroy medium and heavy MPV’s will also destroy these MPV’s, but the personnel casualties will be less due to the smaller crews and retaliation against the ambush will be fierce by the supporting vehicle. An added protection measure is that due to their mobility they will be more flexible in selecting routes making them less prone to prepared ambushes and IED’s. The light MPV will not and should not replace the medium and heavy MPV or MRAP  which will always be used for mass transportation of personnel and mostly escorted by a pair of light MPV’s. The light MPV’s will also be used to escort logistic convoys, transport and escort VIP’s, as rover and liaison vehicles for commanders, tactical command vehicles as well as tactical ambulances and rescue vehicles. The higher mobility and high fire power of the light MPV provide a massive leverage to its functional protection level to ensure high combat survivability. It allows the security forces to eliminate the threat by taking the fight to the threat thus minimising civilian casualties, collateral damage and security force casualties. The Puma M26-15 MPV from OTT in South has been designed and developed for the roles of the Light Mine Protected Vehicle. With a Gross Vehicle Mass (GVM) of 8,2 tons and a crew of 10 including driver it offers high mobility, agility and protection against small arms fire, tank mines and side blasts from IED’s. In the Patrol version the same vehicle has a crew of 6 with a 12.7mm or 14,5mm Heavy Machine Gun  (HMG) in a protected turret while the rear 270˚ plus is covered by a Light Machine Gun in a 360˚cupola. Both variants, APC and Patrol, have shooting ports all round the sides and rear of the vehicle enabling the crew to react with suppressing fire from the protection of the vehicle. The M26 Patrol can also be fitted with an Anti-Tank Guided Missile (ATGM) light turret or 40mm Automatic Grenade Launcher (AGL) in place of the HMG turret thus expanding its offensive application even more. For the automotive part the proven Tata 715TC 4x4 drive line is used thus ensuring easy repair and maintenance as well as robustness and reliability.